Benin should allocate at least 5 per cent of its GDP for social priorities to promote human development and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), according to a new UNDP report by a team of national experts. The Benin National Human Development Report 2003, launched recently in Cotonou, the capital, focuses on financing for human development and finds that public spending on social priorities -- including basic education and health care, nutrition and water supply and sanitation – is inadequate.

Civil society representatives presented an 'alternative' declaration to the official Declaration that was expected to be approved by the world's governments at the final day of the World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva. The civil society declaration -called “Shaping information societies for human needs”- was needed because the process has constantly been disillusioning and frustrating, said representatives at the heavily-attended conference.

To mark International Human Rights Day (10 December) and in solidarity with our sisters and brothers from Zimbabwe, CIVICUS together with Amnesty International has launched a petition campaign to protest the systematic violation of fundamental rights in Zimbabwe, and in particular, the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, association and assembly. This petition will be submitted to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Heads of State and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Geneva.

The Civil Society Watch team of CIVICUS invites you to take action by signing the petition below, listing your name and country of origin.

As a sign of your commitment to this campaign, please forward it to as many people as possible. The campaign ends on 16 December 2003. If you receive this email by that date or if you are number 500 on the list, please send it back to [email]roberto@civicus.org

Do not miss this opportunity, it will make a difference and you will be part of it.

PUT AN END TO REPRESSION IN ZIMBABWE

We would like to express our serious concern about the continued violations of civil liberties in Zimbabwe, particularly against the freedom of opinion and expression, association and assembly. The systematic and grave attacks on civil society organisations caused by government policy have been escalating since the parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2000 and 2002. The government has introduced restrictive legislation, outlawing dissent and placing fundamental rights under siege. All opposition and criticism have been blanketed as criminal and a threat to the state. The legislation has clamped down on any activities that might promote pluralist views, closing spaces for development and severely impacting civil society. As a result, many organisations have either closed down or are treading cautiously.

We call upon the United Nations (UN) and the governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to address the government of Zimbabwe to immediately cease all intimidation, arbitrary arrests and torture of members of the civil society and to immediately repeal and/or amend progressively all unjust and repressive laws which contravenes international and national law and which are incompatible with principles and provisions enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other international human rights instruments; in particular the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO), the Miscellaneous Offences Act, and other pieces of restrictive legislation.

It requires a great deal of political clarity to sort the issues on Zimbabwe and a short message cannot do it in depth. Nevertheless I think it is important to make some clarifications on the question of race and criticism of President Mugabe.

1. It is not proper or correct to allege/imply that [all] black Mugabe critics are in effect supporters of white supremacy.

2. I for example could never be accused of being such a person. I do not need to go into detail but suffice to say that all my life, I have fought and will continue to fight against all manifestations of racism.

3. I have also lived under [and suffered the consequences of the repression of] another undemocratic African government that did not have a land controversy at hand to blur the issues. I have had the unfortunate benefit of seeing journalist colleagues disappear, be jailed, tortured, killed and hounded in to exile in many countries. None of them were supporters of white supremacy. [Ironically, ‘western’ interests supported some of such dictators such as Mobutu of Zaire especially during the cold war]

4. Yes there is an overwhelming need for land reform and redistribution not just in Zimbabwe but also across southern Africa. In truth it should have been done - not in the last two years - but long ago. It can also be done in a civil way without inciting lynch mobs to murder people.

5. The issues in Zimbabwe are not just about minority whites owning the most land and blacks not having access to land. It is also about democracy and human rights, which are universal concepts. Black people are dying of AIDS and Famine in Zimbabwe.

6. Yes there is a reasonable element of racism in the support for anti-Mugabe forces by some white people and western interests. Such interests are clearly identifiable and there is no need to mix them up with those that don’t share their interests. [Descendants of colonial settlers for instance would be happy to hang on to their land under any circumstances and would never have spoken up for human rights of Africans were they not under attack themselves.]

7. While it is true that white people that have not suffered the consequences of slavery, colonialism, apartheid or racism do not appreciate the extent to which race may colour their perception of issues and how this in turn colours how their actions and policies are perceived by Africans. The truth is that not all white people are racists. Some have even fought and died for the anti-apartheid, anti-colonial struggles and the civil rights movement etc.

8. Mugabe need not have waited till he faced growing political opposition to sort the land problem. He could have done it when there was little or no opposition anytime in the previous 20 years. While it is true that some interests will rather ruin Zimbabwe than see land reform, the truth is that Mugabe’s policies are also undermining the Zimbabwean economy.

9. It may seem attractive to some people to imply that because white colonial settlers murdered millions of Africans and violently seized land, the same should be done to them. However although ‘revenge’ may give immense satisfaction, this simply reduces the perpetrators to the same bestial mentality that generated colonial murder and exploitation. [There will never be enough space here to discuss the place of revenge and vengeance in the human psyche and society, if it is appropriate or not, to what extent is it reasonable and so forth.] More importantly if land reform is the objective, it can be done without mayhem. Prior to the last elections Zanu-PF had enough political strength to ensure land reform in a constitutional manner. It is not impossible to do so even now.

10. Finally and to reiterate: It is possible to campaign for democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa without being a supporter of white supremacy. Note also that:
(1) If you fight the beneficiaries of undemocratic policies by undemocratic means, you loose your legitimacy and moral authority especially if you play on a legitimate cause to selfishly hang on to power and the fall out is that thousands of innocent people suffer the consequences. (2) To campaign for democracy, free expression and other rights in Zimbabwe is not an endorsement of the MDC or its policies.

The fallouts of slavery, colonialism, apartheid and more sophisticated modern day exploitation of Africa can only be solved by more democracy and more human rights, not less. Some racists that were never and never will be democrats will exploit circumstances to hang on to their land. However in the long run, a genuinely democratic Zimbabwe will not accept minority control of majority land, but will address the problem in a non-violent and democratic manner.

Black people around the world are undermined by the black critics of Mugabe. The black critics are supporting white supremacist beliefs that black people:
i. should be denied rights and economic benefits enjoyed by white people;
ii. should support white leadership because of their inferiority.

In general, the Zimbabwean issue is about whether black people can limit the selfish interference of Western elites in their own countries. In particular, it is about black people restoring ownership of their land from white beneficiaries of colonialism. This is a southern African problem because in the region the descendants of colonisers own most of the best land.

Black people should not judge Mugabe's black critics on the basis of their opposition to his violence and 'dictatorship'. The real issue is their relationship to the white supremacist campaign to remove a leader who is in opposition to it. The critics are dangerous because they refuse to openly oppose white supremacy.

Mugabe's violence is not the issue. Violence was needed to remove colonialism in Zimbabwe. No doubt, there were human rights abuses during the struggle. Yet, a key objective was black land ownership. Violence is a natural outcome of white farmers refusing to give up land their descendants stole through violence. The MDC has no problem with violence. But, in no way would British people accept most of their land being owned by non-whites.

Democracy is not the issue. Reporting on the 2002 Presidential elections, the Tanzanian Observer Mission concluded: "The results of the election are the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe." A similar conclusion was reached by missions from Mozambique, Russia, the former OAU, China, Zambia, Malawi, the December 12th Movement from the US, Iran, and Japan. The two missions most quoted in the West were from a Commonwealth group, dominated by white nations, and from opposition MPs in southern Africa, which was funded by the anti-Mugabe European Union. Mugabe's black critics use them as the basis of their 'Mugabe stole the elections' claim.

What is the issue? A massive, covert and overt regime change campaign by white elites. Is it because they love human rights and democracy? This group is lead by Zimbabwean white farmers, white South Africans, right-wing Western politicians and business leaders. This group has the support or acquiescence of white liberals. Some white liberals are fooled. Yet, the politics of the leaders are white supremacist. They share the politics of people who actively opposed the Zimbabwean national struggle.

A network of organisations are leading this campaign. It includes: Zimbabwe Democracy Trust, the Westminster Democracy Foundation, the European Union's Africa Working Group, the London-based Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the US State Department. There are also, of course, Western governments. Their methods are:
- the creation of and financial support of opposition groups
- use of money to turn civil groups into oppositional groups
- use of violence to destablise Zimbabwe and provoke the Government
- crippling the Zimbabwean economy
- a media campaign
- threatening black countries with the withdrawal of financial support.

On 4 August 2002, The Sunday Mail in Harare reported: "…the British government had funded the opposition party to the tune of nearly Zim$10m in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. The opposition party has also confirmed this." The report reveals that the MDC receives financial backing from Germany, Holland, Denmark and the US.

In other words, Western elites have created and funded opposition groups and have sought to undermine the economy to produce more support from Zimbabweans. These elites are engaging in foreign activity that would be unacceptable in their own countries.

The strategy of the black critics is to blind people to any other issue other than Mugabe's human rights abuses. Yet, these are abuses they deliberately provoke. The most charitable view of them is that they are suffering so much from those abuses that they are blind to or do not consider the white supremacist agenda of their allies. But this makes them dangerous fools.
It could be that they are aware of the white supremacy of their allies and have struck a faustian deal them to get rid of someone who is far worse. But if Mugabe were that bad there would be former members of the War Veterans fighting alongside former members of the Rhodesian army to get rid of the 'brutal dictator'.

It could be that their actual alliance is with white liberals. But clearly white supremacists are using white liberals as a respectable front for their colonial ambitions. The black critics still ought to be deliberately distancing themselves from the white supremacists. Yet, none of this is a satisfactory explanation. The reality is that the leaders of the black critics are paid hands of racists. It is the continuing silence of the so-called opposition that proves their complicity in white supremacy.

The announcement by Zimbabwean government officials that they would pull the country out of the Commonwealth following their continued suspension raised the stakes dramatically, ironically on the eve of International Human Rights Day on December 10. This has serious implications for the organisations capacity to promote human rights in Africa and amongst non-African countries.

If the commonwealth takes no further action, it would appear all a country has to do to side step its authority is to withdraw from it. If however it decides to take further steps against the Zimbabwean government as provided for in its Harare principles, it risks widening the split in the organisation and triggering a spiralling crisis. It is significant that the 14 member Southern African Development Community (SADC) issued a statement on the 10th of December expressing its "displeasure and deep concern with the dismissive, intolerant and rigid attitude displayed by some (Commonwealth) members." The organisation called for “engagement” and “not isolation” saying, isolation “will do nothing to assist the people of Zimbabwe overcome their difficulties".

In this respect, a strong complicating factor is the apparent double standards exhibited by some ‘western’ governments. The idea for instance that any government could float the idea of relaxing sanctions on, or even ending the suspension of Pakistan while simultaneously calling for stiffer penalties against Zimbabwe at the Commonwealth may yet rank in history alongside the worlds biggest foreign policy blunders. Some Asian countries especially India, which is a traditional opponent of Pakistan, would also have watched this closely. Alluding to this David Ellery, writing in the letters pages of the UK Guardian of December 9 2003, stated, “Mugabe is missing a trick. All he has to do is offer to send a token force to Iraq and Blair and Bush will be praising him as a bulwark of democracy and human rights.”

This double standards and what is seen by some African governments as covert support by some ‘western’ governments for opposition interests opposed to land reform has not only strengthened Mugabe’s resolve, it has mobilised his party behind him as well as those African governments that share a similar colonial past.

However, it is important to remember that the central problem as regards Zimbabwe is not the resolution of the problems in the Commonwealth. The central problem is the resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe. The contradictions in the Commonwealth have long existed and Zimbabwe has only brought them to the fore again.

To many around the world [including within the Commonwealth], the crisis has several sides to it. To some the question is “are you for land reform or not?” To others the question is “are you for democracy and human rights or not?”

These questions have been shaped by the perceptions that to be strongly for land reform suggests uncritical support for the Mugabe government and its policies and that to be strongly for human rights and democracy suggests an uncritical alliance with ‘white farmers’, ‘former colonial masters’ or the opposition as currently represented by the MDC.

This conundrum confirms that as is sometimes the case, the perception is as important as the reality. In this case, key factors behind these perceptions are race and political convenience.

Conflicts that are complicated by race and ideology are often tricky waters to navigate. It is necessary therefore to be courageous and unambiguous in standing by principles that will facilitate consistency. In the case of Zimbabwe, it is time for courage.
It is therefore possible in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, to stand:
- For democracy;
- For the rights to freedom of opinion, expression, association, assembly, and political participation;
- Media freedom;
- And simultaneously recognise the urgent need for land reform and redistribution to correct the injustices of colonialism based on racist oppression, discrimination and exploitation.

It is also principled to stand for correction of colonial injustices and simultaneously demand that the need for land reform and redistribution should not and cannot be used as an excuse or cover to sanction violence and murder. Land reform can and must be carried out but only on a constitutional and equitable basis. This should have been the position of the Commonwealth; this should be the position of the African Union and of the SADC.

It is important to sort out the Zimbabwean crisis now on the basis of clear and unambiguous democratic principles not just for Zimbabwe, but also because the land problem may rear its head in South Africa sooner than many think. If it manifests in South Africa on the same basis as it has in Zimbabwe then the legacy of apartheid, the unresolved issues around race, the economic divide, the sharper role of ideology in the liberation struggle and the size of the country and economy – all will combine to make it far worse than it could ever be in Zimbabwe.

Africans and democratic minded African leaders and governments must not allow perceived ‘western’ double standards to distort their views on democracy. It is possible for President Mugabe to be a former liberation fighter, to have been once democratically elected and to now pursue undemocratic policies. Violence is not necessary to ensure land reform in Zimbabwe. It is also not justified by the fact that colonial settlers used violence and murder to illegitimately seize land from Africans. Had it been determined to do so before it started facing political problems, the Mugabe government could have enforced land reform in a constitutional, legitimate and equitable way at any time in the last two decades.

For this reason African rights campaigners must be steadfast on the question of rights and democracy in Zimbabwe and appreciate the fact that support for democratic principles in Zimbabwe is not the same as endorsing the policies of “western interests”, or any opposition parties or organisations. International rights campaigners and non-African governments must also be clear and unequivocal that in addition to campaigning for democratic principles that they stand for land reform and redistribution as a step towards correcting the injustices of Zimbabwe’s colonial past. If not, they risk becoming part of the problem instead of contributing to the solution.

Given the opportunity, the people of Zimbabwe will make the right choices and these choices will in the long run be consistent with democratic principles, human rights and correcting the injustices of the colonial past on a constitutional, just and equitable basis.

*Sankore is a member of the Pambazuka Editorial Board and is Coordinator of CREDO for Freedom of Expression and Associated Rights, which works on rights issues in Africa. CREDO can be contacted via Pambazuka News or via [email]info@credonet.org

* See the Letters and Comments section of Pambazuka News for letters and debate on Zimbabwe.

Under pressure from world public opinion, especially from the Jubilee 2000 movement for debt cancellation, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 1996. In 1999, the Initiative was revised to include more countries that were left out in its first phase.

But another important characteristic of the “enhanced” Initiative was the addition of a new conditionality, called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which all eligible countries were required to submit in exchange for “debt relief”. The PRSP requirement was an implicit recognition on the part of the two institutions of the utter failure of structural adjustment policies (SAPs), which, for more than two decades, had been imposed on developing countries, in exchange for loans.

The PRSPs, we are told, represent a “major departure” from SAPs, in that they are “nationally-owned” and aim at “reducing poverty”, according to the two institutions. But what is the reality behind the rhetoric?

The myth of “national ownership”

If we are to believe the IMF and the World Bank, the PRSPs are “country-driven” and reflect the priorities of each country in its fight against poverty. Accordingly, the PRSPs are drafted after a large “participatory process”, involving the government, civil society organisations (CSOs) and even the private sector. But in reality, “national ownership” is more theoretical than real.

For one thing, the PRSPs should follow a framework proposed by the International Financial Institutions. That framework, spelled out in a voluminous document called the PRSP Sourcebook published by the IMF (Ames et al., 2001) proposes “sound macroeconomic policies” to HIPC countries in drafting their PRSP. It is consistent with the conditionalities attached to the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), the new name of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).

The compliance with PRGF conditionalities makes the basic macroeconomic framework non negotiable: fiscal austerity; trade and investment liberalization; deregulation of labour and goods markets; emphasis on export-led growth; privatisation of utilities and State-owned enterprises are at the heart of PRSPs.

So, African governments and civil society organisations (CSOs) are left with only one option: identify areas where safety nets are most needed to “alleviate poverty”. For this reason, African governments tend to put in their PRSPs what the IMF and the World Bank would like to see in those documents, rather than what their development priorities are.

On the other hand, CSOs have been frustrated by the PRSP process. They found out that they were used more as alibi than considered as true partners whose opinions are valued and taken seriously. In several countries, including Uganda, Mauritania, Senegal, Tanzania and Mali, CSOs have found themselves as the “guinea pigs” of the PRSP process.

Moreover, democratically-elected bodies, such as National Parliaments, have been ignored by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). Finally, we know that the final say belongs to the Boards of the two institutions, which should give their seal of approval to any PRSP before its implementation. Under these circumstances, talking about 'national ownership' is a bit disingenuous, to say the least.

The myth of “pro-poor” policies

It is even more disingenuous on the part of the BWIs to claim that PRSPs contain “pro-poor policies”. As indicated above, the basic macroeconomic framework is the same as the one that underpinned the failed and discredited SAPS. For this reason, there is a big gap between policies that are in the interests of the poor and most of the recommendations contained in the PRSPs. For instance, low-income and poor groups call for cheaper and more affordable prices of staple goods and for free access to basic services. This is in contradiction with the delivery of such services by the market, as recommended by the BWIs.

The privatisation of essential services, like water and electricity and the deterioration or privatisation of public services, such as health and education, have never been in the interests of the poor. For instance, the imposition of user fees on health care or education has led to a sharp drop of hospital attendance and school enrolment from poor or low-income families and increased the gender gap, since girls and women are the main victims of those policies.

In Senegal, where water is privatised, poor and low-income groups in urban areas pay three to four times more than rich groups. Still in Senegal, the liberalization of the groundnut sector, imposed by the IMF and the World Bank against the will of the government, cost at least 400 jobs following the dissolution of one State-owned enterprise and led millions of peasants and their families to the brink of famine. The Government had to draw up an Emergency Relief Plan worth more than $23 million to avoid a national catastrophe.

On the other hand, price deregulation and the elimination of subsidies have led to the collapse of the purchasing power of average citizens, in particular of low-income groups. This explains, inter alia, why in Senegal more than 64 % of people surveyed in the PRSP document said that their situation has worsened between 1995 and 2002, a period of so-called “high growth rates”.

Still in Senegal, the liberalization of the groundnut sector, evoked above, led to a sharp fall in agricultural production in 2002. This, in turn, resulted in a more than 50 percent decline in economic growth, from 5.6 % in 2001 to 2.4 % in 2002, according to early estimates. The difference is an annual income loss of roughly $200 million for a country where two out of three citizens live under the poverty line.

How, in the world, can the IMF and the World Bank claim that such policies aim at “reducing poverty” and are “pro-poor”?

Another example is Zambia, where in less than 10 years, the textile industry was wiped out as a result of sweeping trade liberalization undertaken under the Chiluba regime. The Zambian textile industry fell from 140 units to 8, shedding in the process more than 90 % of the workforce. In several other countries, local industries have been destroyed by cheap imports of poor quality, in the name of “free trade” imposed by the IMF and the World Bank.

But it is widely documented that trade liberalization is one of the main causes of the widespread poverty experienced in the world as well as the widening gap between the rich and the poor. The latest UNICEF Report, the State of the World's Children, indicates that in some developing countries more than 90 percent of children under 5 are in absolute poverty. Trade liberalization, deregulation and privatisation are among the factors behind that catastrophic situation, according to the Report, which was released in October.

Trade liberalization has worsened Africa's terms of trade. A study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2001 indicates that if Africa's terms of trade had remained at their 1980 level:
- the continent’s share in world trade would have been double its current share;
- average per capita income would have been 50 percent higher;
- annual economic growth would have been 1.4 percent higher than.

In light of this, it is clear that trade liberalization has been costly to Africa. It has led to the collapse of the continent's commodity prices, increased its external dependency and destroyed many local industries. The same UNCTAD study has indicated that Africa's de-industrialization has accelerated since the 1980s.

Still according to that study, capital flight has worsened as a result of financial liberalization. This flight, combined with debt service, has resulted in net financial outflows from Africa to developed countries over the last 20 years. In other words, the poorest continent is financing the richest countries. This is one of the most glaring achievements of the IMF and the World Bank.

Indeed, more trade and investment liberalization, more deregulation, more privatisation and a further weakening of the State are more likely to generate more poverty than promote economic and social well-being. No wonder in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) about 500 million live on less than $2 a day, according to the World Bank. This number is projected to rise to more than 600 million in 2015, despite all the fuss about the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Therefore, so long as the PRSPs, like the now discredited and failed SAPs, are within the framework of the neolberal model, they will generate more poverty than “reduce” it. And like SAPs, the PRSPs will ultimately fail.

Conclusion

After spreading poverty at an unprecedented scale in Sub-Saharan Africa and in other developing countries, the IMF and the World Bank are trying to mislead world opinion, especially in the North. They make people believe that they are really committed to “reducing poverty.” But the truth is that this has never been their intention. Their real mission is to promote the interests of global capitalism, by opening Africa's economies to multinational corporations and financial speculators and by transforming them into markets for Northern countries' goods and services.

The true mission of the BWIs in Africa and elsewhere should have been clear to everyone, especially to NGOs familiar with their philosophy and policies. Yet, some African NGOs, which have been among the leading critics of SAPs and in the forefront of the struggle for debt cancellation, have been misled by the BWIs' rhetoric on PRSPs. These NGOs have found some “merits” to the PRSPs and think that with the emphasis on more spending for social sectors, like education, health and nutrition, the PRSPs could help “alleviate poverty”.

This is a big mistake. One cannot trust the BWIs to reduce poverty in Africa or elsewhere. So long as they avoid challenging the unequal power relations that define the unfair rules of the international financial and trading system, these institutions will never be in a position to “help” Africa or other developing countries. In reality, what the IMF and World Bank try to achieve with the PRSPs is to:
- create the illusion of “poverty reduction” while pursuing the same failed and discredited policies, with even more conditionalities;
- promote a superficial “national consensus” on short-term “poverty reduction” programs at the expense of a serious and deep reflection on long-term development policies;
- drive a wedge between “reasonable” and “radical” civil society organisations in Africa;
- shift the blame to HIPC countries' governments and citizens for the inevitable failure of the PRSPs.

* Demba Moussa Dembele is Director of the Forum for African Alternatives. Click on the link below for references to this article.

* Please send comments on this editorial - and other events in Africa - to

The 15th plenary assembly of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) parliamentary forum that was held in Lesotho last week has approved the establishment of a regional parliament that would complement the work of the continental African Union parliament.

A key decision-making body comprising representatives of Guinea-Bissau's main political parties and the armed forces has set March 28 as the date for legislative elections to return the country to constitutional rule following a coup in September. The National Transitional Council agreed the date last Thursday. Presidential elections are due to follow 12 months later.

The United Nations’ annual World Economic and Social Survey argues that trade protectionism in wealthy countries, especially policies that target agriculture and textiles from the South, present the biggest threat to the people of poorer countries. While recommending more South-South trade, the report warns that “openness and liberalization are not a panacea for poverty reduction.”

The head of Kenya's state-owned power company plundered the institution for nearly two decades, according to an official Government investigation. Samuel Gichuru, the managing director of Kenya Lighting and Power for 19 years, is said to have stolen millions of Kenyan shillings.

Long-delayed local council elections in Nigeria have been scheduled for 27 March 2004 throughout the country’s 36 states, officials said. James Omo-Agege, a retired high court judge, who is chairman of the Forum of States Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria, told reporters on Tuesday they were yielding to "mounting pressure from various stakeholders" including political parties and civil society groups.

Mbeki's government has stumbled from one crisis to the next, argues Sipho Seepe, acting vice-chancellor of Vista university. There was the arms deal investigation, the plot hatched against senior members of his party, the controversy around HIV/Aids, heightened tensions within the tripartite alliance highlighted by embarrassing anti-privatisation protests, the Treatment Action Campaign against government and the continued stand-off between government and the media. And tendencies displayed by Mbeki show that a third term may not be out of the question.

Developing countries are now being asked to follow developed countries in the privatisation of goods and services previously provided by the state. It is argued that these countries will gain from the creation of efficient markets which offer their best chance to establish competitiveness, leading to economic growth. But critics claim that privatisation damages the quality of public services and undermines public accountability. Conventional forms of regulation address these two issues; but is it also possible to regulate for development that reduces poverty?

The trial of former Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba, charged with 168 counts of theft totalling more than $40m of public money, has begun. Mr Chiluba is accused of conspiring with a number of senior officials to divert public funds into a London bank account for private use.

An International Monetary Fund technical team is in Luanda this week seeking to mend years of problematic relations with Angola. But as fresh signs of rapprochement emerge, a new chapter has opened in a murky saga involving debt deals with Russia, long a stumbling block in the country's relations with the IMF. A rapidly expanding offshore oil industry and abundant other resources make Angola one of Africa's brightest prospects. But the economy has been undermined by decades of civil war and corruption.

A businessman, Abubakar Atiku Bagudu, detained in the United States for allegedly conspiring with Mohammed, son of Sani Abacha, the late military dictator, to steal public funds, has agreed to transfer about $300 million (N40.566 billion) to the federal government. The said amount was deposited in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Limited Bank on the Isle of Jersey.

A section of the Ghanaian media have undergone a one day training course on Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D) at the Ashanti regional capital Kumasi. The training workshop which was organized by the Ghana Information Network for Knowledge Sharing (GINKS) and PenPlusBytes (International Institute for ICTs Journalism) attracted twenty-five senior journalists from both the print and broadcast media in the northern part of Ghana: Upper east, Upper West, Northern Region, Brong Ahafo and Ashanti Region.

This book draws together the different theoretical approaches underpinning civil society strengthening programmes, the nature of the state and its relations with civil society as well as the role of capacity building in the context of civil society strengthening. The book challenges the monitoring and evaluation of civil society: are programmes being evaluated, what have we learnt and what mechanisms can we use to improve our learning?

The purpose of this book is to provide a detailed introduction to the process of developing monitoring and evaluation systems which will provide a foundation on which to advance personal and organisational learning. It is based on the work of The International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) in research, consultancy and training and is rooted in real experiences.